中國上市公司於2006年5月起可以利用私募募集資金，定向增發的數量逐年上升，成為企業主要募集資金管道。本研究以2006年至2015年進行定向增發的公司為樣本，檢視保薦機構聲譽對定向增發折價幅度影響。本研究亦檢視保薦機構聲譽對公司於定向增發前盈餘管理幅度是否有所影響。由於發行公司董事需配合保薦機構履行監督責任。本研究檢視探保薦機構聲譽與獨立董事專業能力交互作用對定向增發前盈餘管理幅度之影響。此外，本研究檢視保薦機構聲譽與獨立董事兼職程度交互作用對定向增發前盈餘管理之影響。
實證結果顯示，保薦機構聲譽對於折價幅度並無顯著影響。實證結果亦顯示，企業聘任聲譽高的保薦機構，其定向增發前盈餘管理幅度顯著較低。此外，實證結果顯示，保薦機構聲譽與獨立董事專業能力交互作用，及保薦機構聲譽與獨立董事兼職交互作用對定向增發前盈餘管理幅度並無顯著影響。

Chinese listed firms can raise funds through private placements after May 2006. Number of applying private places gradually increase. Private placement has become an important financing alternative for firms. This study investigates to what extent of private placement discount is affected by the reputation of private placement discount is affected by using sample of private placements from 2006 to 2015. This study also examines to what extent of earnings management before private placements is affected by a sponsoring company’s reputation. Moreover, this study examines (1) how the interaction between a sponsoring company’s reputation and independent directors’ expertise, and (2) how the interaction between a sponsoring company’s reputation and independent directors’ interlocking affect the extent of earnings management before private placements.
The empirical results indicate that a sponsoring company’s reputation has no significant impact on the discount of private placements. The empirical results also indicate that the magnitude of earnings management before private placements is significantly smaller for firms which hire a high reputation sponsoring company. Furthermore, the empirical results indicate that the interaction between a sponsoring company’s reputation and independent directors’ expertise has no significant impact on the magnitude of earnings management. The empirical results also show that the interaction between a sponsoring’s reputation and independent directors’ interlocking does not significantly affect the extent of earnings management.

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