本研究主要目的為觀察在出現CEO Turnover時，原任CEO是被迫離職會使公司偏好選任外部經理人擔任CEO，我們以證交所公開資訊觀測站之重大訊息公告專區宣告更換總經理之台灣上市公司為研究樣本，結合台灣經濟新報TEJ+自公司年報與發布消息所彙整出與總經理替換之相關資訊，來探討本研究之目的。
根據以往文獻記載，被迫離職通常與績效表現不好相關，而這也進一步讓公司選擇任用外部經理人的可能性增加，我們這邊將被迫離職作為研究主要的自變數，加入累積異常報酬、股價淨值比、股東權益報酬率、公司基本資料等控制變數，而是否為外部經理人作為應變數，透過羅吉斯迴歸模型觀察對選擇繼任CEO的偏好為何。結果顯示若前任CEO為被迫離職對繼任CEO的選擇較有可能聘請外部經理人，接著探討家族企業對聘用CEO管道的偏好，也發現家族企業也漸漸更有意願聘請專業經理人來擔任CEO一職。

This study aims to observe the forced resignation that will influence the choice between insiders and outsiders. The information about the CEO turnover was collected from Market Observation Post System and TEJ+. This information and data is used as our research subject.
According to references, it indicated that the forced resignation is related to poor firm performance so the selection of an outsider as CEO is more likely. We use forced resignation as independent variable, CAR, P/B ratio, ROE and some company profiles as control variables, and outsider as dependent variables. We use Logit model and examine their relationship. The result shows that if the departing CEO was forced to leave and the outside CEO is more likely to be selected.
We further test the family-owned corporation and use it as independent variable to observe the preferences about the CEO succession. The result also shows that a family-owned corporation is gradually more willing to hire an outside professional manager as the new CEO.

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