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研究生: 施昱賢
Shih, Yu-Xian
論文名稱: 中國家族企業接班與租稅規避行為之探究
Exploring the Succession in Chinese Family Business and Tax Avoidance
指導教授: 陳慧玲
Chen, Huei-Ling
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理研究所
Graduate Institute of Management
論文出版年: 2017
畢業學年度: 105
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 89
中文關鍵詞: 家族企業租稅規避創辦家族接班
英文關鍵詞: Family firms, Tax avoidance, Founder family, Succession
DOI URL: https://doi.org/10.6345/NTNU202202988
論文種類: 學術論文
相關次數: 點閱:135下載:0
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  • 近年來,中國家族企業數量逐年增加,在資本市場佔有重要地位。中國家族企業的股權集中於家族成員,且家族成員多擔任董事。因此,型II代理問題可能較嚴重。此外,中國法規制度不完善,使得家族企業有誘因進行規避租稅。本研究旨在探討相較於非家族企業,家族企業是否傾向進行租稅規避。本研究亦檢視創辦人是否擔任董事長及子女是否接班對中國家族企業租稅規避的影響。本研究選取2010年至2015年在上海及深圳交易所上市之企業為樣本,實證結果顯示,相較於非家族企業,家族企業較傾向規避租稅。實證結果亦顯示,創辦人是否擔任董事長及子女是否接班對於家族企業租稅規避僅有部分年度有顯著影響。

    In recent years, the number of Chinese family firms increased every year. Family firms play important roles in the capital markets. The ownership of the Chinese family firms is concentrated in the family members, and the family members serve as directors. Thus, Type II agency problems may be more severe. In addition, because the legal system in China is incomplete, family firms may have incentives to avoid taxes. The objective of this study is to explore whether compared to non-family firms, family firms are more likely to avoid taxes. The study also examines whether the founder serving as the chairman and the succession affect the magnitude of tax avoidance. The sample of this study is selected from firms listed in Shanghai Stock Market and Shenzhen Stock Market from 2010 to 2015. The empirical results show that compared to non-family firms, family firms are more likely to avoid taxes. The empirical results also show whether the founder serving as the chairman and succession have significant impact on tax avoidance of family firms only in serveral years.

    致謝辭 I 摘要 II ABSTRACT III 目次 IV 圖表目次 V 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機 1 第二節 研究目的 3 第三節 研究架構 4 第四節 研究貢獻 6 第二章 文獻回顧 7 第一節 家族企業相關文獻 7 第二節 租稅規避 9 第三節 中國家族企業之現況及其相關研究 12 第三章 研究設計 16 第一節 研究假說 16 第二節 變數定義 18 第三節 實證模型 21 第四節 樣本選取及資料來源 23 第四章 實證結果 24 第一節 描述性統計 24 第二節 單變量統計結果 50 第三節 多變量統計結果 60 第四節 敏感性分析 74 第五章 結論與建議 85 第一節 研究結論 85 第二節 研究建議 86 參考文獻 87

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