本研究旨在探討中國家族企業資訊透明度與分析師行為之關聯性，以中國深圳交易所2009年至2013年之上市A股作為研究樣本，並以深圳交易所公告之資訊揭露評比作為企業資訊透明度衡量依據，透過分析師追蹤人數、分析師盈餘預測誤差、分析師盈餘預測離散程度及發佈長期預測之分析師人數四種特性，檢視分析師行為是否會因企業型態不同或資訊透明度不同而有所差異。本研究認為相較於非家族企業，中國家族企業會因為其資金成本考量及永續經營之聲譽，而傾向提高資訊透明度。而家族企業資訊透明度高低會對分析師追蹤人數及發佈長期預測之分析師人數造成影響，且當家族企業資訊透明度越高，會使得分析師具有較高的盈餘預測準確性與較低的盈餘預測離散程度。
實證結果顯示，相較於非家族企業，家族企業的資訊透明度並無顯著較佳。若家族企業資訊透明度越佳，分析師追蹤人數增加但發佈長期預測之分析師人數減少。此外，家族企業資訊透明度越佳，並未顯著影響分析師盈餘預測準確性之提升與盈餘預測離散程度之降低。

This paper aims to investigate the relations between information transparency of Chinese family firms and financial analysts’ behaviors. We use the A-share listed Chinese family firms in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2013 as samples. The rating of information disclosure evaluated by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange is used as the proxy of information transparency. We investigate whether business types and the magnitude of information transparency affect the number of analyst following, earnings forecast errors, earnings forecast dispersion, and the number of analysts issuing long-term forecasts. We propose that compared with non-family firms, Chinese family firms tend to increase the information transparency in order to lower cost of capital and maintain reputation. Furthermore, we conjecture that information transparency of Chinese family businesses may affect the number of analyst following and the number of analysts issuing long-term forecasts. We also propose that when the information transparency is higher, earnings forecasts are more accurate and earnings forecast dispersion is lower.
Our findings indicate that the information transparency of family firms is not significantly better than that of non-family business. When the family firms has better information transparency, the number of analysts following increases but the number of analysts issuing long-term forecasts reduce. Moreover, information transparency does not significantly affect the accuracy of earnings forecasts and the degree of forecast dispersion.

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