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研究生: 鄭勝駿
Cheng, Sheng-Chun
論文名稱: 公司治理對市場評價偏差之影響-以台灣上市櫃電子公司為例
The Impact of Corporate Governance on Market Misevaluation-Evidence from Listed Electronic Companies in Taiwan
指導教授: 蔡蒔銓
Tsai, Shih-Chuan
口試委員: 蔡蒔銓
Tsai, Shih-Chuan
許和鈞
Sheu, Her-Jiun
盧秋玲
Lu, Chiu-Ling
口試日期: 2024/05/24
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 高階經理人企業管理碩士在職專班(EMBA)
Executive Master of Business Administration
論文出版年: 2024
畢業學年度: 112
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 47
中文關鍵詞: 公司治理董事會結構股權結構偏離度市場評價偏差
英文關鍵詞: corporate governance, board of directors structure, ownership structure, deviation, market misevaluation
研究方法: 量化分析法
DOI URL: http://doi.org/10.6345/NTNU202400504
論文種類: 學術論文
相關次數: 點閱:39下載:0
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  • 本研究探討台灣上市櫃電子公司的公司治理情況及其對市場評價偏差的影響,並提出多面向的公司治理指標,包括:董事會結構、股權結構以及偏離度等三類,以分析各類公司治理指標中的重要因子對市場評價偏差之間的關聯影響。研究樣本篩選上市及上櫃的電子產業的1004家企業作為樣本,研究期間為2008年1月1日至2022年12月31日。研究分析不同面向的公司治理指標加入相關的控制變數,研究結果顯示,對於市場評價偏差的影響具有統計上的顯著意義:(1) 在董監酬勞較高的企業,董事會規模越大或獨立董事比例越高時,不利於公司的市場評價;在公司治理評鑑較高的企業,獨立董事比例越高時,不利於公司的市場評價。(2) 在淨利或市值較高的企業,董監持股比例越高,有利於公司的市場評價;在市值較高的企業,董監持股、大股東持股或機構投資人持股比例越高,有利於公司的市場評價。(3) 在經理人薪酬較高的企業,盈餘股份偏離比或股份席次偏離比越高,有利於公司的市場評價。實證結果提供企業改善公司治理結構與市場評價偏差之參考。

    The purpose of this research was to explore the impact of corporate governance on market misevaluation from listed electronic companies in Taiwan. Besides the multi-indicators of corporate governance, including three aspects: board structure, ownership structure, and deviation ratio. The data from 1,004 companies during the period from 2008 to 2022. Adding business operating variables in different aspects, the impact on market evaluation deviation is more significant in statistic. The empirical findings indicated the following: (1) In companies with relatively high remuneration for directors and supervisors, the larger board of directors or the higher proportion of independent directors, it will be detrimental to the company's stock price. In companies with higher corporate governance evaluations, the higher proportion of independent directors, it will be detrimental to the company's stock price. (2) In companies with higher net profits or market capitalization, the higher the proportion of shares held by directors and supervisors, it will be beneficial to the company’s stock price. In companies with higher market capitalization, the higher the proportion of shares held by directors and supervisors, major shareholders or institutional investors, it will be beneficial to the company’s stock price. (3) In companies with higher managerial compensation, the higher deviation ratio of the earnings-to-share or the stock-to-seat, it will be beneficial to the company's stock price. The findings provide the suggestions for companies to improve corporate governance and reduce market misevaluation.

    第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景及動機 1 第二節 研究目的 3 第三節 研究流程 4 第二章 文獻探討 5 第一節 董事會結構 5 第二節 股權結構 6 第三節 偏離度 8 第四節 經營績效與薪酬 9 第三章 研究方法 13 第一節 研究假說 15 第二節 變數定義 18 第三節 模型設定 23 第四章 實證結果分析 26 第一節 敘述統計 26 第二節 迴歸結果分析 29 第五章 結論 42 參考文獻 45

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