此研究提供一個整合的架構，結合資源基礎說、交易成本理論、代理理論以及社會資本理論四種觀點，來解釋為何母企業選擇外部的經理人做為其新創企業之高階經理人。
由於人力資本的獨特性，員工對於廠商來說，是無法完全掌控的企業資源。在實務上的管理決策，當母企業進行多角化或成立新創企業時，母企業不僅僅會考量候選人所能帶來的利益，同時，母企業也會考量使用內部或外部經理人所需要的交易成本。
根據資源基礎說，廠商的資源包含了所有的資產、能力，組織系統以及所掌握的知識與資訊。廠商必須對其所握有的資源做出最有效率的配置以達到建構其本身獨特的競爭優勢之目的。因此，廠商在考量新創企業之經理人之人選時，應該要考量內部或外部經理人之能力，並選擇最能夠提供經濟價值的經理人為其最適配置。
此研究解釋了廠商如何根據不同的廠商形態或是環境條件，選擇基於不同的觀點來進行其人力資源配置。我們以廠商的營運目標為增加企業的經濟價值為研究前提，藉由此研究提出，儘管廠商的人力資源配置考量，不僅是專注於候選人所能帶來的利益，同時也會考量使用候選人所必須付出的控制成本。但是若廠商具備有足夠的經歷以及能力降低使用人力資源的控制成本時，廠商就會更關注於候選人所能產生的利益，而較不關注於使用人力資源所產生的控制成本。

This study provides an integrated framework, based on resource-based view, transaction cost theory, agency theory and the perspective of social capital to explain the managerial practice of why a parent company chooses external manager instead of internal employee as the executives of new ventures.
Due to human resources are not completely controlled by firms. We found that in practical managerial decisions, when parent company is processing diversifications or establishing subsidiaries, the consideration of executives of new ventures is not only measured by the comparative capabilities of external or internal candidates, but also by the economic cost of using human resources.
This study explains how firms change their perspective of choosing executives according to the variations of environments or their self-condition. Given that firms will make their deployment of managerial resources more appropriate to increase its economic value. This study provides evidences that although firms are not only considering to deploy its’ managerial resources to create benefits, but also considering to reduce the controlling costs of deploying human resources. However, when firms have the abilities or experiences to overcome/reduce the costs of using human resource. Firms will concentrate more on how candidates contribute to increase benefits, and care less about reducing the controlling costs of using human resources.

Barney, J. B. (1991). ‘Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage’. Journal of Management, 17, 1, 99–120.
Becker, B.E., & Gerhart, B. (1996). The Impact of Human Resource Management on Organizational Performance: Progress and Prospects. Academy of Management Journal, 39, 779-801.
Birkinshaw, J.M., Hood, N., Johnsson, S. (1998). Building firm-specific advantages in
multinational corporations: The role of subsidiary initiative. Strategic Management Journal, 19(3), pp.221–241.
Bolino, M. C., Turnley, W. H., & Bloodgood, J. M. (2002). Citizenship behavior and the creation of social capital in organizations. Academy of Management Review, 27, 505–522.
Borgatti, S. P., Mehra, A., Brass, D. J., & Labianca, G. (2009). Network analysis in the social sciences. Science, 323, 892-895
Brass, D. (2009). A Social Network Perspective on Industrial/Organizational
Psychology. Industrial/Organizational Handbook.
Coase, R. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4, 386-405.
Coase, R. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44.
Coff, R. W. (1997). Human assets and management dilemmas: coping with hazards on the road to resource-based theory. Academy of Management Review, 22, 2, 74–402.
Coleman, J.S., (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Foss, N. J. (2009). Human capital and transaction cost economics. Center for Strategic
Management and Globalization Working Paper No. SMG WP 2/2008.
Granovetter, M. (1973) The Strength of Weak Ties, American Journal of Sociology,
78, 1360-1380.
Glosten, L., and P. Milgrom. (1985). Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogenously Informed Traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 71–100.

Hambrick, D., Mason, P. (1984). Upper echelons: the organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9(2), 193-206.
Hanifan L. J. (1920), The Community Centre, Silver Burdette and Co, Boston, pp.78-9.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–60.
Taylor, S. (1999). National origin and the development of organizational capabilities: the case of international human resource management in two Japanese MNCs’. In Beechler, S. L. and Bird, A.( Eds), Japanese Multinationals Abroad – Individual and Organizational Learning. New York: Oxford University Press, 131–50.
Mitchell, J. Clyde (1969) Social networks in urban situations. Analyses of personal relationships in central African towns. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
O’Donnell, S. W. (2000). Managing foreign subsidiaries: agents of headquarters, or an independent network?. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 525–48.

Ouchi, W. G. (1979). A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control mechanisms. Management Science, 25, 838–48.
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. 3rd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Schlicht, E. (1984). Cognitive Dissonance in Economics, in H. Todt (Hrsg.),
Normengeleitetes Verhalten in den Sozialwissenschaften, 61 - 82, Berlin: Duncker&Humblot
Tan, D. C.,Mahoney, J. T.(2006). Why a multinational firm chooses expatriates: Integrating resource-based, agency & transaction costs perspectives. Journal of Management Studies, 46(3), 457-484.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust implications. New York: Free Press.