板橋選區已經是典型的大都會選區，選民的教育水準、民主素養，相較於以往鄉下型的選民來說，要以派系來區分是不容易的事情。更有人認為，就是因為受到單一選區兩票制度的影響之下，打破了地方派系壟斷選舉資源，讓地方派系逐漸式微，喪失原本的掌控力。
　　連立委本人都認為，現在的選民由於對於地方、中央的權責關係並不清楚，只要遇到問題都會想要找立委，反而不是透過分工體系來進行，導致有些立委還要向地方政府來協調，甚至出現立委里長化的情況，如此將會造成委員們只能兼顧選區，對於立法上的專業品質，可能就無法有效提升。
　　競選的時候，與其在文宣上如何加強標語，或者是提出其他政策白皮書，都不比平常努力深耕選區，與民眾良善的互動還要來得重要。由板橋選區可以知道，現任者的優勢主要是能夠在4年的任期當中，透過選區服務來扎根，並且與選區選民已經達到相當默契的關係，導致日後要與他競選的候選人，很難打敗現任者，除非是倚靠大環境，如當時的選舉氛圍，簡言之，配合總統大選的候選人形像，也會影響到現任立法委員的優勢。
　　對於單一選區兩票制施行後，大致上是認同會形成兩黨政治居多，但是仍有人提及在立院有小黨利用議事規則來進行重大法案的技術性阻擾，而並非是完全兩黨政治。大部份的人都認為其實立法委員要受到立法院所屬的黨團規範，實在是太難，主要原因是每個立委背後都有選區壓力，簡言之，背後都有無數個利益

BanQiao district has developed into a typical urban electoral district. The educational standard of the electors, the level of democracy, comparing with the rural electoral district, it seems difficult to differentiate into factions. Some says, the single-member district and two-vote system is the main key which broke the monopolization of the election resources from the local factions. Therefore, the influence and the control of the local factions were minimized.
From the legislator, without clear boundary, publics are lack of knowledge to differentiate the relation of local authority and central, which misleading to the chain of authority, sometimes the legislators are too busy focus on the local affairs instead of legislate. This led to the insufficiency of the quality of the legislation.
During the election, it is better to involve more in the electoral district other than adding more attracting slogan or offering more policy. From BanQiao district, we can clearly understand that the current legislator has the advantages within his term of service by serving the public and has had a great chemistry with the public. This advantage has leaded the current legislator an undefeated stage in the upcoming election, unless the trend of the country is different from now. In other word, the images of the candidate of the president will also influent in the election of the legislator.
The single-member district and two-vote system is known as two-party system, however it is not exactly only involve two parties. This is because there are still smaller parties in the legislative Yuan whom influent in the decision of the major policy. And also, some says, it is too difficult for the party to rule all the legislators. All the legislators have their own electoral district to be answered. In conclusion, thousands of interest groups are seeking help from the legislators therefore the influential of the political party is minimized.
After the interview, the single-member district and two-vote system really makes a lot of easier to turn into the two-party system but Taiwan is currently applying the combine system of both. Therefore smaller parties are somehow critical in making the decision of the major policy. This is a disadvantage for us if we are going towards
the two-party system such as the united state.In addition, the boundaries of the electoral district have to be clear, the electors and the legislators have to be more connected, and this emphasized the Representative Democracy. However, the priority of the electoral districts is more important due to the stronger connection between the electors and the legislators. There are some slightly changes occurred, the role of the legislators are now becoming more like a parliament member, from providing the responding services into striving for the local benefits.
The researches on the single-member district and two-vote systems are having more details towards the system; however I choose to carry on my research in a more minor level. Therefore I suggested, for the future researches, we can focus more on the cases and scenarios. We can also include delimitation of the electoral district into our research. With all these, we will have a more sufficient way to examine the pros and cons of our election system. Lastly, by analyzing the experience of OECD, we can have more sufficient suggestion to our election of legislators system.
the two-party system such as the united state.In addition, the boundaries of the electoral district have to be clear, the electors and the legislators have to be more connected, and this emphasized the Representative Democracy. However, the priority of the electoral districts is more important due to the stronger connection between the electors and the legislators. There are some slightly changes occurred, the role of the legislators are now becoming more like a parliament member, from providing the responding services into striving for the local benefits.
The researches on the single-member district and two-vote systems are having more details towards the system; however I choose to carry on my research in a more minor level. Therefore I suggested, for the future researches, we can focus more on the cases and scenarios. We can also include delimitation of the electoral district into our research. With all these, we will have a more sufficient way to examine the pros and cons of our election system. Lastly, by analyzing the experience of OECD, we can have more sufficient suggestion to our election of legislators system.

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