企業經營需要有各功能的協作，行銷、業務、財務、人力資源等企業功能全體運作，而這些企業功能不是每一家公司都有能力、或有必要將全部功能由自家企業中養人操作。企業功能外包給外部廠商，企業主專注主業經營，部份功能外包降低成本，更可引進專業的人員與資源，對企業經營更有效益。

行銷功能外包給專業的行銷服務公司是大多數企業選擇的方式，尤其是握有豐富行銷預算的廣告主，將行銷功能委外的前提，外包的行銷服務公司具有專業度外，在業務人員的專業度，甚至於在個人特質與關係建構上，也需要與廣告主有一定的磨合與互動，以確保日常的工作溝通可以順暢有效率。

企業與企業間互動關係，在法規上以簽定契約建立規範，而契約上的規範通常僅能限制於簽約前，簽約前需要將法定合約中的內容盡可能完全簽定。然而，業界實際操作契約發生在合作關係建立前，無法將所有未來可能發生的狀況都未卜先知詳列在契約中，企業往來的合作中，隨著時空變化許多商業條件也會有變動，若契約不完善，就讓廠商有投機行為發生之虞。在日常的契約履行都需要透過人，建立關係規範來抑制投機行為的發生也提高企業績效。

契約規範包含契約制定外，還包含專屬資產、罰則、獎勵，甚至包含稽核機制以確保事前的契約規範制定完整；欺騙說謊、隱瞞、作弊及操作資訊不對稱等這些最不希望在合作關係中發生的投機行為，期待發展關係規範如資訊交換、彈性、合作、正直誠信及承諾等來降低投機行為發生的機會或可產生抑制力。本研究透過文獻探討發展研究架構與假設，透過半結構式質化訪談研究方法進行驗證，期望先由本研究開啟企業間組織行為在關係規範下的研究，對未來企業對企業的合作可以有正向助益。

Business operations require the collaboration of various functions, marketing, business, finance, human resources, and other enterprise functions, and these enterprise functions are not every company has the ability, or it is not necessary to operate all functions by their own enterprises. Enterprise functions are outsourced to external suppliers, business owners could fully focus on the main business, some function outsourcing reduces costs, and professional personnel and resources can be introduced, which is more effective for business operations.

Marketing function outsourcing to professional marketing service companies is the way most enterprises choose, especially advertisers with rich marketing budgets, the premise of outsourcing marketing functions outsourcing marketing service companies have professionalism, in the professionalism of business personnel and even in the construction of personal characteristics and relationships, it is also necessary to have a certain run-in and interaction with advertisers to ensure that daily work communication can be smooth and efficient.

The interaction between enterprises and enterprises establishes norms in terms of regulations by signing contracts, and the norms on contracts can usually only be limited to before signing, and the contents of statutory contracts need to be signed as fully as possible before signing. However, the actual operation contract in the industry occurs before the establishment of the cooperative relationship, and it is impossible to list all the possible future situations in the contract, and in the cooperation between enterprises, many business conditions will change with the change of time and space, if the contract is not perfect, it will make the manufacturer have the risk of speculation. In the daily performance of contracts, it is necessary to establish relationship norms through people to curb the occurrence of speculation and improve corporate performance.

In addition to contract formulation, contractual norms also include exclusive assets, penalties, rewards and even audit mechanisms to ensure the integrity of prior contractual norms; deception, lying, concealment, cheating and asymmetry of operational information, which are the most undesirable speculative behaviors in the cooperative relationship, and it is expected that the development of relationship norms such as information exchange, flexibility, cooperation, integrity and commitment will reduce the chance of speculation or produce inhibition. This study explores the development of research structures and hypotheses through the literature and examines the evidence through semi-structured qualitative interview research methods, hoping that the research on inter-firm organizational behavior under the relationship norm will be of positive benefit to future enterprise-to-business cooperation.

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