「三歲幼兒對於錯誤相信與思考泡泡作業的理解情形
及以思考泡泡活動介入之效果研究」
摘  要
 本研究目的在於探討台灣三歲幼兒對錯誤相信概念的理解之發展，並嘗試將教學活動與幼兒錯誤相信理解之發展相連結。本研究第一部份主要是為了解台灣三歲幼兒對錯誤相信與思考泡泡之理解情形的基礎探究，研究對象來自台灣某縣之兩所幼兒園中68位三歲幼兒，研究者試圖運用錯誤相信相關作業（未預期移位作業與未預期移位作業）來探究三歲幼兒錯誤相信之理解的發展，並運用思考泡泡相關作業，探究幼兒對思考泡泡圖畫表徵特質的理解與運用情形。本研究第二部分則試圖檢視思考泡泡活動介入對於三歲幼兒錯誤相信之理解的效果，研究中針對實驗組13位大三歲組和18位小三歲組幼兒進行一系列蘊含錯誤相信概念的思考泡泡活動，並檢驗思考泡泡活動介入對於增進三歲幼兒理解錯誤相信相關作業的效果。
 研究結果發現，性別、園別、年齡（大、小三歲）語言能力等變項並未對幼兒在錯誤相信作業之表現造成影響，且大小三歲組幼兒對錯誤相信作業的理解表現並未因年齡不同而有所差異。進一步比較三歲幼兒在錯誤相信---未預期移位作業與未預期內容作業的表現差異，發現三歲幼兒在未預期內容作業的表現優於未預期移位作業的表現，此可能與幼兒在未預期內容作業中先經歷自己的錯誤相信以及情節內容較為直接明瞭有關。此外，針對錯誤相信作業之問題內容用字的部分進行比較，也發現使用「想」與「找」的字詞對於三歲幼兒判斷他人錯誤相信的正確性並無顯著影響。比較三歲幼兒在檢測自己錯誤相信與預期他人錯誤相信的表現，研究結果發現幼兒在「檢測自己錯誤相信」與「預測他人錯誤相信」的表現並無顯著差異，多是一致性未通過檢測自己及預測他人錯誤相信的問題。
本研究雖然未針對三歲幼兒日常生活的對話進行觀察，但從幼兒們在開放性問題的回答內容分析中，發現三歲幼兒使用認知狀態的詞彙，如「想」、「知道」、「猜」、「覺得」等描述主角心智狀態的比例明顯少於以欲求有關的詞彙，如：「想要」、「喜歡」等來描述主角的錯誤相信。
 本研究「思考泡泡作業」顯示三歲幼兒在施測者簡單的引導之下，不僅能夠理解「思考泡泡」是「他人思考的顯示」，也懂得運用「思考泡泡」作為判斷外在情境中他人想法之依據，更能透過「思考泡泡」理解主角的錯誤相信與事實狀態間的差異，清楚辨別兩者的不同。隨著幼兒年齡增長，大小三歲幼兒對於思考泡泡的理解則呈現兩種發展特性：（1）隨著幼兒年齡增長，大三歲組幼兒比小三歲組幼兒更能理解「思考泡泡」具有表徵他人錯誤相信的特質；（2）隨著幼兒年齡增長，幼兒則會持續改變對「思考泡泡」與「他人心智狀態」等開放性問題的回應，年齡愈大的幼兒愈能清楚地陳述自我意見。
 本研究第二部分針對三歲幼兒思考泡泡活動介入的重點包括：在每個思考泡泡活動中運用思考泡泡圖畫呈現的方式以討論及強調主角的想法、思考、相信（真實相信與錯誤相信）和行動間的關係，讓幼兒藉由思考泡泡的圖畫表徵瞭解主角的思考狀態；運用觸覺與嗅覺活動強調幼兒個人思考狀態的存在；運用故事敘述提昇幼兒對於故事主角思考狀態的注意；讓幼兒參與活動以增進對故事主角想法與行動關係的理解。結果顯示，三歲實驗組與控制組幼兒在錯誤相信作業的表現達到顯著差異，且大三歲實驗組幼兒在思考泡泡活動介入後，其在錯誤相信作業後測總分(2.08分)超過機會水準(2分)，小三歲實驗組幼兒的表現也趨近機會水準（1.89分），顯示以「思考泡泡」圖畫表徵心智狀態的方式則有助幼兒理解原本不可見的心智運作內容，而能通過後測的錯誤相信作業。此外，實驗組幼兒在錯誤相信--未預期移位作業中的進展優於在錯誤相信-未預期內容作業的表現，意謂思考泡泡活動的介入不僅有助於三歲幼兒意識到他人思考、想法與相信等心智狀態的存在和行動間的關係，而思考泡泡活動中多以未預期移位作業的故事敘述為主，更增進了三歲實驗組幼兒在未預期移位作業的表現，因而突破在錯誤相信作業的瓶頸。
 本研究結果發現台灣三歲幼兒對於錯誤相信作業的理解方面，呈現與國外幼兒共通的發展趨勢，即三歲幼兒對於錯誤相信的理解仍在持續發展。此外，運用思考泡泡活動的教學效果方面，發現三歲幼兒對錯誤相信的理解上有顯著進展，顯示思考泡泡活動介入有助於提昇幼兒對錯誤相信的理解可能性。

An abstract of
Young Children’s Comprehension of False Beliefs Tasks and of Thought Bubbles Tasks, and the Intervention Effect of Thought Bubbles with Extensive Activities

The purpose of this study was to explore preschoolers’ understanding of false belief and thought bubbles. Researcher also tries to use the intervention of activities of thought bubbles as a device for representing such mental states. The subjects of first part of this research was 3-year-olds and came from two kindergartens located in urban. We choose 64 3-year children as subjects including 31 elder 3-year-old children (36 month to 42 month) and 33 younger 3-year-old children (42 month to 48 month). Researcher describes and analyzes variables as gender, age, and language ability related to children's responses to false belief tasks.
The second part of this research was to use training activities of thought bubbles to help 3-year-olds develop or realize the way to reason more usefully about people's thoughts to pass standard false belief tasks. The second part of this research was to experimentally manipulate 3-year-olds exposure to training activities with thought bubbles to determine whether they would have some impact on children's performances on measures of false belief.
There was no gender, age, school, and language ability difference found in the measures of false belief. The results show that 3-year-olds typically perform poorly except in measure of false belief. The interpretation of these finds is the 3-year-olds suffer from a conceptual deficit of one kind or another. They are said to lack a concept of belief or a concept of mental representation.
 In a series of 4 thought bubbles tasks, researcher explored preschooler's understanding of thought bubbles. Very few 3-year-olds knew what a thought bubbles depiction was without instruction. But it simply told that the thought bubbles “shows what someone in thinking”. The vast majority of 3-year-olds readily accept and understand thought bubbles as depicting thoughts. In total, 3-year-olds used thought bubbles depictions to ascertain the content of characters' thoughts in a variety of situations; appropriately distinguished such depicting from mere associated actions or objects, described thought bubbles in the language of mental states. Thought bubbles provide a device to help 3-year-olds to identify the characters' counter to fact thought correctly plus knowing the real content of box plus offering that the thoughts and the reality were different.
The second part of the research, the intervention process emphasizes 2 aspects: 1.Stress and describe the mental state of protagonist in form of thought bubble. 2. Use thought bubbles to provide a more general approach to reason about protagonists' behaviors and mental states.
The present data support the effect of false belief. The 3-year-olds in test group
performs better in false belief tasks than the 3-year-olds in comparison group. The mean scores of false belief measures did differ after intervention. In test group, elder 3-year-olds perform better than younger ones in false belief tasks. The 3-year-olds in test group perform better in unexpected-transfer tasks than in unexpected-content tasks. It implies that thought bubbles training activities may enhance children's awareness of protagonist's beliefs, thoughts, and action. Moreover, thought bubbles training activities enhance 3-year-olds perform better in unexpected-transfer tasks.
For further research, the result of this research provide the thought bubbles were easier to device and use in multiple teaching methods and activities to enhance young children to aware person's mental states.

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