本研究主要是在探討不同的機構投資人如何影響公司的併購。本研究的結果顯示不同的機構投資人在監督不同的併購時會有異質性的影響。當避險基金持有越多公司的股票時，對於併購公司的股票報酬有正向的影響。相反地，當退休基金持有越多投資公司的股票會負向的影響併購公司的股票報酬。此外，本研究亦篩選出擁有較高股權的機構投資人當作子樣本，藉此增加模型的穩健性。而本研究發現，在子樣本中機構投資人與併購公司股票報酬率的關係更加強烈。

This paper examines the role that different institutional investors play in corporate M&A activities. Findings show that institutional investors are heterogeneous monitoring agents. Hedge fund holdings are found to be significantly related to improved acquirer returns on M&A announcement. On the contrary, high pension fund ownership leads to decreased returns and value destroying acquisitions. Stronger relation between institutional investors and acquirer returns are found in subsample of acquirers with high level of institutional ownership.

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