本研究旨在建構二元評估雙系統理論模式，以描述個體在面對推理問題時的思考歷程，並以基礎率忽略題及蒙提霍爾題作為實驗作業，探究二元評估模式中，Type 1歷程「反應強度評估」以及「衝突評估」這兩個後設認知的運作機制。研究結果顯示：一、在「衝突評估」方面，不管在快速回應或是完整敘述版本的基礎率忽略題，受試者在衝突題都呈現反應時間較長、答題信心較低的結果。但在蒙提霍爾題，僅有高邏輯組受試者的衝突題答題信心及中獎機率預估選擇信心較非衝突題低，低邏輯組則無顯著差異。即便增加蒙提霍爾題的困難度，受試者仍敏感於初始反應間的衝突性。二、在「反應強度評估」方面，受試者面對快速回應版本基礎率忽略題，高邏輯組非衝突題答題信心及認知脫鉤反應答題信心都高於低邏輯組，但合理化反應答題信心沒有較低、反應時間也沒有較長。面對完整敘述版的題目時，高邏輯組非衝突題答題信心較高、反應時間也較長，高邏輯組合理化反應時間也較低邏輯組長，但認知脫鉤反應和合理化反應的答題信心都沒有符合研究預期。至於蒙提霍爾題，高邏輯組非衝突題答題信心、中獎機率預估選擇信心都高於低邏輯組，但認知脫鉤反應和合理化反應的答題信心也都沒有符合研究預期。
整體來說，本研究有四個主要發現，第一、證實二元評估模式Type 1歷程中，有反應強度評估及衝突評估兩種後設認知的觀點，且反應強度評估啟動先於衝突評估。第二，在衝突性及強度評估方面，受試者在基礎率忽略題的敏感性都較MHP好。第三，不管是基礎率忽略題還是MHP，受試者對於非衝突題強度評估敏感度較衝突題佳。第四，在衝突敏感度上，受試者對於基礎率忽略題，不論高低邏輯都能展現出衝突敏感度，但對於MHP，受試者僅對高邏輯題目有衝突敏感度。

This study aims to construct a dual evaluation model to describe the individual's thinking process in the face of reasoning problems. We use the base-rate neglect problem and the Monty Hall problem as tasks, to explore the two mechanisms of metacognitive process: “response intensity evaluation” and “conflict evaluation”. Results showed that, First, in the aspect of "conflict evaluation", regardless of the rapid-response or the full narrative version, the conflict group showed a longer reaction time and lower confidence than the congruent group. However, in MHP, only the high logic group subjects' response confidence and probability choice confidence of the conflict items were lower than the congruent items, while the low logic group had no significant difference. Subjects were still sensitive to the conflict between the initial responses even in the case of difficulty improvement. Second, in the "response intensity evaluation", high logic group showed lower response confidence of congruent items and higher response confidence of decoupling response in the rapid-response version of the base-rate neglect problem. In the full narrative version, high logic group showed higher response confidence, long response time and long rationalization response time of congruent items. As for the MHP, the response confidence and probability choice confidence of the high logic group on congruent items were higher than the low logic group. However, there were no significant difference in the confidence of the high and low logic groups in rationalization and cognitive decoupling response.
Overall, there were four main findings in this study. First, we confirmed that in the Type 1 process of the dual evaluation model, there are two kinds of meta-cognition, “response intensity evaluation” and “conflict evaluation”, and the response intensity evaluation starts before the conflict evaluation. Second, the subjects of base-rate neglect problem showed better sensitivity of the conflict and response intensity than those of MHP. Third, the subjects showed higher response intensity sensitivity to congruent items than the conflict ones. Fourth, Subjects had conflict sensitivity for base-rate neglect problem, regardless of high or low logic groups, but for MHP, only high logic groups had conflict sensitivity.

楊國樞（1999）：中國人之基本性格向度、結構及效應的系統性研究。國科會特約研究計畫成果報告 （NSC86-2143-H002-026）。台北：行政院國家科學委員會。
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