本研究假說1-1、1-2及1-3分別以獨立董事比例、董事會成員具備專業背景之比例與董事會平均出席率來衡量董事會之獨立性、專業性以及參與程度，探討董事會之獨立性、專業性、參與程度與公司治理評鑑結果之間的關聯性，並以受評之上市櫃公司剔除金融業為研究對象，實證結果一發現董事會之獨立性、專業性與參與程度高，公司治理評鑑結果表現愈佳，支持本研究之假說1-1、1-2及1-3。
本研究亦進一步探討公司治理評鑑結果對公司價值的影響，採用二階段最小平方法探討公司治理評鑑結果與公司價值之間的關聯性，在考慮獨立董事比例、董事會成員具備專業背景之比例以及董事會平均出席率對公司治理評鑑結果的影響後，實證結果二發現公司治理評鑑結果與公司價值呈現正向關係，表示當企業之公司治理評鑑結果表現愈好，隔年度之公司價值愈高，支持本研究之假說2。

Hypotheses 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3 of this study respectively explore the relationship between the independence, professionalism and participation aspects of the board of directors and the evaluation of corporate governance. They are measured by three independent variables: the proportion of independent directors, the proportion of board members with professional backgrounds, and the average attendance rate of the board of directors. The financial industry is excluded from the evaluation of listed and OTC companies. The empirical results show that the higher levels of independence, professionalism and participation aspects of the board of directors, the better performance of corporate governance evaluation are, which supports hypotheses 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3 of this study.
This study also further explores the impact of corporate governance evaluation results on corporate value. The two-stage least square method is used to discuss the correlation between corporate governance evaluation results and Tobin's Q. After considering the possible endogenous problems and taking whether the company has established an audit committee as a tool variable, the empirical result 2 finds that the corporate governance evaluation results and Tobin's Q show a positive relationship. This indicates that the better performance of corporate governance evaluation is, the company has higher Tobin's Q in the following year, which supports hypothesis 2 of this study.

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