展望理論指出加權函數與價值函數的乘積總和為某一展望的整體價值，且決策者對於整體價值的主觀評價會影響其判斷與選擇；然而先前研究聚焦價值函數而忽略加權函數，許多在價值函數上的實驗也欠缺外部效度。此一研究探討非形式謬誤Pascal賭注，推論基督徒會由於對其信仰的信念做取樣、定錨與不充分的調整；此時會在決策間產生早期喜好而曲解關於信仰的訊息，而導致不理性的決定。
　　此一研究所要考驗的便是基於信仰的決定是否照例為早期喜好效果所導致的訊息扭曲所影響，要求一百二十六名基督徒與二百七十八名非基督徒假想信仰神祇與下注字母，決定信仰與下注的對象，並用判斷與選擇模式來交叉驗證。預測基督徒會在基於信仰的決定中不理性地選擇與判斷，而參與者在其它條件下的反應則會是理性的；結果大致驗證了此一研究的假設，信仰會透過早期喜好效應而影響決策。
　　此一發現不只擴大了早期喜好曲解訊息在決策上效應的適用情境，也提供了基督徒易於曲解關於信仰訊息的實徵證據；除了提醒基督徒最大化其決定的整體價值之外，亦得作為判斷與選擇教育政策立場的參考。

Prospect theory indicated that a sum of the products of weighting functions and value functions is an overall value of a prospect, and that a subjective evaluation of an overall value by a decision-makers will influence their judgments and choices; however, previous research focuses on value functions, ignores weighting functions, and many of the experiments on value functions lack external validity. This study investigates an informal fallacy called Pascal's Wager, and infers that Christians would sample, anchor and insufficiently adjust their Christian beliefs. This, in turn, would generate early-emerging favorite during decision making and distort information in respect to faith, and then cause irrational decisions.
Therefore what this study tested was whether faith-based decisions would be influenced by the distortion of information commonly caused by the early-emerging favorite effect.126 Christians and 278 non-Christians were asked to decide the objects to believe in and bet on while hypothetically believing in deities and betting on letters. The decisions was cross-validated by choice and judgment modes. It was predicted that Christians would choice and judge irrationally in faith-based decisions, and that the responses of participants under other conditions would be rational; the results roughly verified the hypothesis of this study that one’s faith would influence his decision making through the early-emerging favorite effect.
This finding not only expanded the situations which the effect of early-emerging favorite distorting information on decision making is applicable to, but also provided the empirical evidence that Christians tended to distort information in respect to faith; in addition to reminding a Christian to maximize the overall value of his decision, it was able to be as a reference to take a position to judge and choice education policies.

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