本研究旨在探討中國上市公司達到分析師盈餘預測門檻的盈餘管理行為與股權結構之關聯性，本研究檢視相較於國有企業，中國民營企業是否較有可能利用盈餘管理以達到分析師盈餘預測。本研究亦檢視相較於中央持有之國有企業，地方政府持有之國有企業是否較有可能運用盈餘管理以達到分析師盈餘預測。同時，本研究檢測經理人員具政治背景與否以及機構投資人持股高低對企業運用盈餘管理以達到分析師盈餘預測可能性之影響。
實證結果顯示，在樣本期間，中國國有企業與民營企業利用盈餘管理以達分析師盈餘預測的現象並無顯著差異。而中央政府持有之國有企業與地方政府持有之國有企業在利用裁決性應計項目以達到分析師盈餘預測並無顯著差異，但是地方政府持有之國有企業顯著地運用過度生產及降低銷管費用方式以達到分析師盈餘預測。此外，經理人具有政治背景與否對企業運用盈餘管理以達到分析師盈餘預測並無顯著關聯。實證結果亦顯示，機構投資人持股比例對企業是否運用盈餘管理以達分析師盈餘預測之可能性並無顯著關聯。

Abstract
This study aims to investigate the relation between Chinese listed firms manipulating earnings to meet or beat analysts’ earning forecasts and shareholding structure. This study also examinewhether nonstate-owned businesses is more likely to manipulate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts than state-owned enterprises. We investigate whether firms owned by local government is more likely to manipulate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ earning forecasts than firms owned by central government. Furthermore, this study investigates whether CEO political connections and the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors are associated with the likelihood for firms to manipulate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.
The empirical results reveal that there is no significant difference in the likelihood of manipulating earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts between non state-owned businesses and state-owned enterprises. We find that firms owned by local government are more likely to overproduce or reduce selling, general and administrative expenses to meet or beat analysts’ earning forecasts than firms owned by central government. Moreover, there is no significant relationship between CEO political connections and the likelihood for firms to manipulate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. There is no significant relationship between the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors and the likelihood for firms to manipulate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.

Keywords: Meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts; Discretionary accruls; Real transaction manipulation

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