本研究檢視省級人大代表選舉前以及選舉後三個月，省長年齡是否使省屬分析師對追蹤同省的地方國企或總部設於該省民營企業，發布相對樂觀偏頗盈餘預測的程度不同。實證分析結果顯示，於選舉前，省長年齡不會影響省屬分析師相較於同省民營證券分析師對追蹤同省企業所發布相對樂觀偏頗盈餘預測的程度。然而，選舉後三個月，省長年齡小於60歲，省屬分析師相較於同省民營證券分析師對追蹤同省的地方國企，發布相對樂觀偏頗盈餘預測的程度顯著較高。
額外分析結果顯示，相較於不同省省屬分析師，同省省屬分析師於選前或選舉後，追蹤同省的省屬地方國企或民營企業，其相對樂觀偏頗盈餘預測程度皆不會受到省長年齡影響。而相較於總部位於其他行政區民營證券分析師，省屬分析師於選舉前或選舉後，追蹤同省地方國企或民營企業，其相對樂觀偏頗盈餘預測程度皆不會受到省長年齡影響。此外，額外分析結果顯示，相較於同省民營證券分析師，同省省屬分析師於選前或選舉後追蹤同省的省屬地方國企或民營企業，其相對樂觀偏頗盈餘預測程度皆未顯著受到省長任期年數影響。

This study examines, before and three months after the election of Provincial People's Congress representatives, whether provincial governors' age affects the relative forecast bias issued by provincial analysts who follow local state-owned or non-state-owned enterprises headquartered in the same province. Empirical results show that compared to analysts working for private securities in the same province before the election, relative forecast bias issued by provincial analysts who follow firms in the same province is not affected by provincial governors' age. However, three months after the election, when the provincial governor is younger than 60, provincial analysts who follow local state-owned enterprises issue relatively optimistic and biased earnings forecasts significantly higher than private securities analysts in the same province.
Additional analysis results show that compared to those issued by provincial analysts in different provinces, relative forecast bias issued by provincial analysts in the same province who cover local state-owned or non-state-owned enterprises in the same province is not affected by the provincial governors' age before or after the election. Compared to those issued by private securities analysts headquartered in other provinces, relative forecast bias issued by provincial analysts who cover local state-owned or non-state-owned enterprises in the same province is not affected by provincial governors' age before or after the election. Moreover, additional analysis results show that compared to those issued by private securities analysts in the same province, the relative forecast bias issued by provincial analysts in the same province who cover local state-owned or non-state-owned enterprises in the same province before or after the election is not significantly affected by the number of years in office of the provincial governor.

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