中國諺語說:「一分錢，一分貨，便宜沒好貨。」由此可知，價格與品質彼此之間相互牽制及連動。商業買賣關係中，由於全球白熱化競爭，買方莫不訴求最低的價格及最高的品質；而賣方則因應降價要求而掙扎於價格與品質的兩難之中，尤其當電子產品周期愈來愈短，不是牽就價格，就是犠牲品質。若不幸發生重大品質事件，各相關聯供應商只能在簽定的契約或非契約關係中尋求解套及進行協商，以期求得最低損失及最大自我保護。
本研究採用個案研究法，藉由POS系統 (亦稱銷售點情報管理系統)顯示器組裝製造商與二大全球性系統整合商間3至4個品質異常事件，探討系統整合商、顯示器組裝製造商及原物料供應商因顯示器產品品質異常，如與系統相容性問題或產品應用層面、產品規格完整性及談判力等因素，當必須面對高額的品質處理費用時，契約作為商業買賣策略工具之一，對品質責任歸屬及品質費用分攤的效用及影響性。另外，當系統整合商進一步要求於採購買賣契約中加簽賠償性條款，顯示器組裝製造商及原物料供應商之態度及因應策略。
研究結果顯示，在相對談判力有差距的情境下，契約的簽署或完整與否對品質責任歸屬的影響有限。處於中間角色的顯示器組裝製造商，為品質成本或風險必然及最高承擔者；系統整合商並未因為契約存在，在談判過程中毫無損失，若事件擴及終端用戶端，為品質事件中最急於找到解決方案者；上游原物料供應商，即使不良肇因於其產品，償付意願及金額高低，端視未來商業利益而定。

Chinese proverb says: "You get what you pay for and the placebo works better than cheap one." It is easily to understand that price and quality are linked tightly and mutually restrained. Benefits from the convenient and transparent information surfing from the internet, in the modern competitive markets purchasers are quite keen and sensitive on pricing to ask for the lowest price and highest quality on suppliers for project bit or RFQ (Request for Quote). Contrary to the purchasers, sellers have no alternative but to struggle between the price and quality. When the life cycle of electronic products is getting shorter and shorter, price and quality inevitably become a trade-off. This trade-off dilemma between purchasers and suppliers is absolutely raised for contingency happened, e.g. big interest conflict or big loss by product quality defective no matter if there is any signed contract existence in between. All involved suppliers are aiming at decreasing the loss or searching for self-protection by all means.
In this research, mainly embody two major global POS (Point of Sale) system integrators who occurred 3 to 4 quality abnormal events on the display products purchased from POS display assembly manufacture. Through these quality events the procurement agreement as one of strategic tools in the business negotiation had been reviewed its necessity and effectiveness when the system integrator, display assembly manufacture and raw material supplier had to negotiate for paying the high amount of quality processing costs which would be resulted from the system compliance, the different product applications, incomplete product specification or unbalanced negotiation power. Moreover this research also indicated the main concerns from the display assembly manufacturer and raw material supplier for acceptance of adding compensational clauses which had been particularly requested by the system integrator in the procurement agreement.
In the gap of relative negotiation power among system integrator, display assembly manufacturer and raw material provider, the existence or completeness of contract has the limited impact on judging the quality responsibility. Reviewing the final negotiation results of these quality events, the display assembly manufacturer would be the highest pricing payer and risk bearer no matter the display assembly manufacturer signed the contract or not with the system integrators or raw material suppliers. From the cases it also turned out that the system integrator took the most positive role to find out the effective solutions when the quality issues were extended to the end users. Raw material suppliers would be willing to pay for the compensation by evaluating the possibility of business nowadays and future.

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