相較一般企業而言，家族企業股權結構特殊且董事會成員多為家族成員，面臨較嚴重的型II代理問題，進而可能影響公司之租稅規避決策，對政府財政來源有所影響。本研究旨在探討兩權分離程度、獨立董事兼任比例及接班壓力對中國家族企業租稅規避的影響。本研究選取2010年至2014年在上海及深圳上市之中國家族企業為樣本，實證結果顯示，兩權分離程度、獨立董事兼任比例及有無接班壓力對家族企業租稅規避程度並無顯著影響。

The ownership structure of family firms is different from that of non-family firms. Family members serve as board of directors at many family firms. Compared to non-family firms, family firms face more severe Type II agency problems. Type II problems may affect firms’ decisions to avoid taxes, which may affect the tax revenue of the government. The objective of this study is to examine whether the separation between control rights and cash flows rights affect the extent of tax avoidance. This paper also investigates to what extent of tax avoidance is affected by the pressure of succession and board interlocking. The sample of this study is family firms listed in Shenzhen Stock Market and Shanghai Stock Market from 2010 to 2014. The empirical results indicate that the separation between control rights and cash flows right has no significant impact on the extent of tax avoidance. The results also indicate that the pressure of succession and board interlocking have no significant impact on the extent of tax avoidance.

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