因為缺乏融資管道，中國的民營企業遇到資金不足的問題，同時，因為沒有建立現代化的公司治理結構，企業的管理效能不高。透過海外上市，民營企業創始人出讓股份以獲得資金來擴大生產活動和經營規模。機構投資者將資金投入企業，對公司治理結構進行改造，推動民營企業上市，從而在股票市場獲利。表面上看，海外上市不但可以幫助民營企業開拓融資管道，還可以改善公司治理結構。受股權結構改變的影響，利益相關者從自身利益出發開始參與公司治理。雷士照明身處快速變革的照明產業，透過在香港上市改變了公司治理結構，成為中國第一大照明廠商，是具有代表性的中國民營企業。本文選擇雷士照明作為個案研究對象來探討中國民營企業的公司治理問題。本文的研究結果認為，通過限制創始人濫用控制權和引導機構投資者適度參與公司治理形成穩定的股權制衡，解決利益分配衝突，進行高質量的信息披露和加強監管等方式可以健全公司治理機制，以助於解決海外上市民營企業的公司治理問題。

Lacking of financing channels, Chinese private enterprises encounter the problem of inadequate funding. Their management effectiveness is not high without a modern corporate governance structure. Through listing overseas, the entrepreneurs sell shares to obtain funds, expanding the scale of production and operation. Institutional investors invest in private enterprises and change their corporate governance structure to promote these private enterprises to go public, making profit in the stock market. It seems that private enterprises not only get more financing channels but also reform corporate governance structure. However, a complicated corporate governance structure means that more stakeholders will participate in corporate governance for their own interests. Sometimes these stakeholders overlook the profit of the whole enterprise. NVC Lighting Holding Limited is a representative of Chinese private enterprises listed overseas. Through listing in Hong Kong, NVC changed its corporate governance structure and improved business performance, but experienced a management crisis result in a poor performance. Through a case study of NVC Ltd., we hope to explore some corporate governance issues of Chinese private enterprises listed overseas.

This study concluded that, preventing the abuse of control of the founder and guiding the behavior of institutional investors to form a stable board of directors, re-distributing the benefit of other stakeholders, discovering more high-quality information and strengthening supervision from the government and stock are important to sound corporate governance mechanism which is the key to solving the problems of corporate governance.

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