目的：本研究目的為探討奧運舉重比賽中臨時排名對風險承擔行為及個人表現之影響。在舉重比賽中，選手在每一階段所增加的重量可用以衡量選手風險承擔的程度，並以選手的試舉成功與否衡量選手的個人表現。方法：本文以2000年、2004年、2008年、2012年、2016年共五屆奧運的舉重比賽為本研究的樣本範圍，所有選手的逐階段之資料，共計954名運動員，7,458個階段的資料，並以一般最小平方法 (Ordinary least squares, OLS)、隨機效果模型 (Random effects model) 及 組間效果模型 (Between effects model)進行資料分析。結果：選手的臨時排名對選手風險承擔行為具正向顯著的影響，且第2至9名之選手呈倒U型。另外，臨時排名會顯著負向影響試舉成功率，而成功率上升之趨勢會隨著臨時排名之下跌而增加。最後，風險承擔行為對個人表現具正向之影響，但其影響會隨重量增加而減少。結論：在奧運舉重比賽中，臨時排名為影響選手風險承擔行為及個人表現之因素。

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of interim rank on risk-taking and performance in the Olympic weightlifting competition. In weightlifting competition, we can use the announcement that players raise to quantify risk-taking levels. Whether the players succeeded can represent the players’ performance. Method: The data of 954 players and 7,458 stages form 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 Olympic weightlifting competitions are collected in this study. Ordinary least squares, random effects model and between effects model are used to analyze the dataset. Results: The results showed that the interim rank had a significantly positive impact on the players' risk-taking behavior, and the 2nd to 9th players were in an inverted U-shaped. Besides, the interim ranking will significantly negatively affect the success rate, and the success rate will increase when the players are behind. Finally, risk-taking behavior had a positive impact on individual performance, but its impact will decrease as weight increases. Conclusion: In Olympic weightlifting competitions, interim rank is a factor that affects players ’risk-taking behavior and personal performance.

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