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Author: 鄭淇
Chi,Cheng
Thesis Title: 中國國有企業民營化盈餘品質之探究
Earning Quality of Privatized Firms-Evidence from China
Advisor: 陳慧玲
Chen, Huei-Ling
Degree: 碩士
Master
Department: 管理研究所
Graduate Institute of Management
Thesis Publication Year: 2012
Academic Year: 100
Language: 中文
Number of pages: 74
Keywords (in Chinese): 民營化盈餘品質盈餘管理更換經理人員
Keywords (in English): privatization, earning quality, earning management, management turnover
Thesis Type: Academic thesis/ dissertation
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  • 本研究係檢視經理人員留任與否,對國有企業民營化前盈餘管理行為之影響,本研究亦檢視民營化企業的控制股東持股比例、政府持股比例、獨立董事比例及機構投資人持股比例對民營化後盈餘品質之影響。
    實證結果顯示,國有企業經理人員若於民營化後不會留任,經理人員可能會利用過度生產或較低的銷管費用進行盈餘管理,提升公司的績效表現,以利經理人員未來的政治升遷或有機會至其他國營事業任職。單變量統計檢定結果顯示,政府持股比例低或機構投資人持股比例低,民營化後盈餘品質顯著提升。在民營化更換經理人之子樣本,其結果則顯示政府持股比例高、獨立董事比例高或機構投資人持股比例低,其盈餘品質顯著提升。民營化前未更換經理人公司子樣本,機構投資人持股比例高,民營化後盈餘品質顯著下降。多變量統計檢定結果顯示,以裁決性應計項目絕對值探討盈餘品質的部分,民營化企業的控制股東持股比例、政府持股比例、獨立董事比例、機構投資人持股比例對於民營化後盈餘品質改變之影響,結果皆不顯著,表示有其他原因可能影響中國國有企業民營化之盈餘品質。以盈餘資訊性探討盈餘品質的部分,民營化前未更換經理人之子樣本,其結果顯示政府持股比例高、獨立董事持股比例高,會導致盈餘資訊性顯著降低,亦即使盈餘品質顯著降低。而民營化前更換經理人之子樣本,獨立董事比例高,其盈餘品質顯著提升。

    This study investigates whether management turnover affects earning management behavior of managers before privatization. This study also investigates whether the percentage of shares owned by controlling stockholder, the percentage of shares owned by government, the percentage of independent director of board, and the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors affect the earning quality of firms after privatization.
    The empirical results show that managers may overproduce or decrease selling, general and administrative cost to improve performance before privatization if managers will be changed after privatization. The results of univariate analyses show that there is significantly negative association between earning quality of privatized firms and the percentage of shares owned by government. The earning quality is significantly higher for firms with lower institutional investors’ shareholdings after privatization. In the subsample of firms with management turnover before privatization, there is significantly positive association between the earning quality of privatized firms and the percentage of shares owned by government. The earnings quality is significantly higher for firms with higher percentage of independent directors. In the subsample of no management turnover before privatization, the results show that there is significantly negative association between the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors and the earning quality. However, the results of multivariate analyses show that the earning quality of privatized firms does not significantly improved for firms with different characteristics.In the subsample of no management turnover before privatization,we find a significantly negative relation between the percentage of shares owned by government and the earning infromativeness. The earnings infromativeness is significantly lower for firms with higher percentage of independent directors. In the subsample of firms with management turnover before privatization, there is a significantly positive association between the earning infromativeness and the percentage of independent directors.

    摘 要...............................i Abstract...........................ii 致謝辭..............................iv 目 錄...............................v 圖 表 目 錄..........................vi 第一章 緒論..........................1 第一節 研究動機.......................1 第二節 研究目的.......................2 第三節 研究架構.......................3 第四節 研究貢獻.......................3 第二章 文獻回顧.......................6 第一節 盈餘品質相關文獻.................6 第二節 公司治理與盈餘品質之關聯性.........7 第三節 中國國有企業民營化情形及其績效......10 第三章 研究設計及方法...................15 第一節 研究假說........................15 第二節 樣本選取與資料來源................18 第三節 變數定義........................19 第四節 研究模式........................22 第四章 實證研究........................26 第一節 描述性統計.......................26 第二節 單變量統計檢定...................31 第三節 多變量統計檢定...................38 第四節 敏感性分析......................58 第五章 結論與建議......................69 第一節 研究結論........................69 第二節 研究建議........................70 參考文獻..............................71

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